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North Korea and Support to
Terrorism: An Evolving History
By Bruce E. Bechtol, Jr.1

Introduction
The DPRK's (Democratic People's Republic of Korea or North Korea) support for terrorism began as an ideologically-based policy financed by the
Soviet Union that eventually led to a policy designed to put money into
the coffers of the elite in Pyongyang—in short, a "proliferation for hire"
policy.2 This article articulates a brief history of the North Korean regime,
the rise to power of Kim Il-sung and his son, Kim Jong-il, and North
Korea's persistent support to terrorist groups around the globe.

North Korea's Beginnings and Kim Il-sung's Rise to
Power
The history of the present North Korean regime began during World War
II (WWII). During that war, there were several partisan groups that
fought with and under the command of both Soviet and Chinese military
forces. One of these groups was led by Kim Il-sung, a young commander
picked by the Soviets to help lead his new nation (North Korea) following
the end of WWII. The DPRK in its infancy was closely supervised by
Soviet "advisers," and largely subsidized by the Soviet Union. Its military
forces also utilized Soviet doctrines in their operations and training.3
During the Korean War, which was initiated by North Korea based on a
plan drawn up with the advice and supervision of Soviet advisors, Kim Ilsung developed a relationship with the People's Republic of China (PRC).
The PRC came to his aid following a near collapse of DPRK forces after
the battle of Inchon and the ensuing push north of American-led United
Nations (UN) forces in 1950. The PRC dedicated large numbers of military forces to the war at the request of Stalin—who provided funding,
logistics, and military equipment to both the PRC and North Korea. Eventually, more than a million Chinese troops were fighting in the Korean
theater of operations by war's end.4 This was the beginning of a relationship that Pyongyang would have with both the Soviet Union and the PRC
until the end of the Cold War.
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Kim Il-sung's Consolidation of Power
Kim was formally "appointed" the leader of North Korea by the Soviets in
1948 (but had been the de facto Soviet appointed leader from 1945 on),
and "elected" as the "Premier of the Republic" during the same time
frame.5 Despite the backing of his Soviet supporters, from 1945 until the
late 1950s, Kim Il-sung had anything but a complete consolidation of
power. Of course, the Korean War limited his complete control of the
country, but perhaps equally as importantly, Kim was also faced with both
pro-Soviet and pro-Chinese factions in his own Supreme People's Assembly and other key governmental institutions. Between 1955 and 1958, Kim
Il-sung purged all or most of those in both the pro-Chinese and pro-Soviet
factions within the Korean Workers' Party (KWP) and all other aspects of
government and society. By 1958 all Chinese troops had been withdrawn
from North Korea.6 These events finally left Kim in complete control of
the country, its economy, government, society, and military forces. The
legacy of totalitarianism continues today through his son, Kim Jong-il.
The elder Kim's rise to power reflected the traditional isolationism of
Korean society for hundreds of years and its resistance to outside influence.7 It also reflected a Confucianist tradition of absolute loyalty to an
individual leader—which was the end result by 1958. North Korea continued to receive massive amounts of aid from Moscow, and to a lesser
extent, from Beijing—but neither of these nations had a significant impact
on how the country was run.8

North Korea's Foreign Policy Goals and Support for
Terrorism: 1960–1988
North Korea from 1948 until the end of the Cold War could be described
as a nation-state that fell within the Soviet sphere of influence. But it was
also a nation that was far more isolated in every way than even other communist states—including countries like China and Cuba. It was this isolationism that kept the Stalinist government of Kim Il-sung "pure," and
allowed him to completely dominate all aspects of government and society in North Korea. This North Korean philosophy, formally defined by
Pyongyang as "juche," (self-reliance) is what kept the DPRK an active
communist state, but also avoided its dominance by larger, more powerful
sponsors or neighbors like the Soviet Union or the PRC.9
Despite the fact that Kim Il-sung was free to pursue a policy that suited
his perceived needs of a militarily-strong North Korea, a Stalinist-Juche
government, and the unification of the Korean Peninsula, North Korea
46

https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol3/iss2/5
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.3.2.5

Bechtol, Jr.: North Korea and Support to Terrorism: An Evolving History

North Korea and Support to Terrorism: An Evolving History

simply could not afford to focus on these issues without external support.
The entire country, for example, was completely subsidized by the Soviet
Union until 1990 and continues to require substantial outside resources
to this day. These resources include the majority of foodstuffs, oil for its
industry and cities, and even the maintenance of the national electrical
grid. North Korea is a country that is seventy percent mountainous, and
thus has been incapable of agrarian self-sufficiency.10 In addition, it does
not have enough coal or oil to sustain its economy—and struggles to garner finances for fossil fuels needed to sustain its economy. These conditions led to one of the most profound and threatening aspects of the Cold
War—proxy operations.
During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union both
engaged in proxy operations, where each nation targeted each other, but
on the soil of other nation-states. Occasionally, these proxy battles
involved non-state actors and terrorist groups. Thus, North Korea's support for terrorism and terrorist groups during the 1960s–1980s allowed it
to maintain its sovereignty and independent policy goals while still "paying back" Moscow for massive subsidies that kept its government afloat.11
As a key part of fitting into the Soviet sphere of influence and "pulling
their weight" among Moscow's allies, the North Koreans actively supported communist and Marxist movements. Key among these operations
was the long-lasting war in Angola, where by 1984 there were 3,000
North Korean regular troops and 1,000 advisors. North Korea also operated training camps in Angola for guerrillas of the African National Congress (ANC) and the South West African People's Organization (SWAPO).
Both organizations were trained in terrorist tactics at these camps. But
North Korea operated far more guerrilla and terrorist training camps
within its own borders. Between 1968 and 1988, North Korea built and
operated at least 30 special training camps within its borders, specializing
in terrorist and guerilla warfare training. Reports at the time indicated
that over 5,000 recruits from some 25 nations visited these camps to take
part in various courses lasting anywhere from three to 18 months.12
Support for nation-states engaging in terrorist tactics was not the only
activity that the North Koreans engaged in at their camps up until the late
1980s. In fact, Pyongyang supported a number of terrorist groups—
particularly in the Middle East. According to National Security analyst
Barry Rubin, "Up until the late 1980s, North Korea trained Palestinian
terrorists, both those belonging to the PLO and from Syrian and Libyanbacked groups." Rubin further states:
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"In Lebanon during the 1970s and in Libya and Syria from the
1980s down to the present, North Korean soldiers have also
trained terrorists for many groups including the Basque Spanish
ETA, Palestinian Abu Nidal organization, Irish Republican Army,
Italian Red Brigades, Japanese Red Army, Moro National Liberation Front in the Philippines, Turkish radicals, and others. While
many of these links have lapsed, in the 1990s, North Korea added
Hizbollah and the anti-Turkish Kurdish PKK group to its roster of
clients."13
According to reports from French press sources, several key Hizbollah
operatives spent time in North Korea. They included (but were probably
not limited to) Hassan Nasrallah, the Secretary-General of Hizbollah;
Security and Intelligence chief Ibrahim Akil; and Mustapha Badreddine,
head of counter-espionage operations.14 On April 30, 1996, during a special press briefing given at the U.S. State Department, Ambassador Philip
C. Wilcox, U.S. Coordinator for Counterterrorism, U.S. Department of
State stated, "In the 1970s and '80s, North Korea had a very serious
record of committing very serious acts of international terrorism."15
North Korea has also been involved with the Japanese Red Army (JRA)
and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). In their
book, The Black Book of Communism: Crimes, Terror, Repression,
Stéphane Courtois and Mark Kramer say:
"Created at the end of the 1960s, when student radicalism in
Japan was at its height and Maoism was in the air, the JRA
quickly made contact with North Korean agents (the Korean community is quite large throughout the Japanese archipelago). The
Korean agents passed instructions to their cadres and brought the
arms the JRA was lacking, but they were unable to prevent a split
in the group in the early 1970s, which resulted in a bloody conflict
between the dissenting and orthodox factions. Accordingly, some
of the cadres simply defected to North Korea, taking refuge in
Pyongyang, where they remain as businessmen and intermediaries with the West. The other faction decided to internationalize its
affairs even further, and joined up with Wadi Hadad. As a result
of this alliance, three members of the JRA acted on behalf of the
PFLP in killing 28 people at Tel Aviv's Lod airport in May 1972."16
The evidence chain connecting the North Korean Government to the
PFLP is further cemented by proof that its leader, Dr. George Habash,
made a visit to North Korea during September of 1970—a trip where he
was reportedly able to procure both weapons and funding.17
48
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The reasons for North Korean support of state and non-state actors during the Cold War were actually twofold. First, it confirmed North Korea's
position as a stout ally within the Soviet sphere of influence and was one
of the factors that kept the enormous subsidies coming. Second, it was an
active element in North Korea's policy at the time (and now) to actively
support state and non-state actors who, like Pyongyang, were hostile to
the United States and its allies. One cannot forget that North Korea then—
and now—regarded the United States as its primary enemy and its main
threat to national survival. The PFLP targeted Israel, one of Washington's
key allies and its most important ally in the Middle East. Thus, supporting
terrorist groups that targeted Israeli citizens and Jews from other nations
was an important element in keeping Washington's efforts focused on
these terrorist acts—and not on North Korea. North Korea continues to
follow this policy, as described in the next section.18

North Korea's Continued Support of Terrorism
Hizbollah
According to sources in both the American and Israeli press, North Korea
supervised the building of underground facilities for Hizbollah in southern Lebanon. According to several reports, all or most of Hizbollah's
underground facilities were built primarily under the supervision of
North Korean instructors in 2003–2004. The facilities were quite extensive and included dispensaries for the wounded, food stocks, and arms
dumps.19 It seems likely that North Korean assistance to Hizbollah served
as a key factor in the challenges that Israeli military forces faced when
they conducted combat operations against Hizbollah during the 2006
conflict. Israeli reporter Lenny Ben-David in 2007 stated that, "Hizbullah's military bases, armories, bunkers and communications networks
were much more extensive than Israel's intelligence services estimated on
the eve of the 2006 war." Ben-David also reported that the tunnel building operations were under the control of the Korea Mining Development
Trading Corporation (KMDTC). KMDTC is a company that has been officially sanctioned by the United States for its illicit activities.20
North Korea also reportedly exported arms to Hizbollah that were used to
inflict casualties on Israeli troops and civilians. An article written by
South Korean scholar Moon Chung-in asserts that the Israeli intelligence
service Mossad has clear evidence that Hizbollah was able to hit the outskirts of Tel Aviv with short-range missiles containing components supplied by North Korea. According to Moon's report, the missile
components first went from North Korea to Iran. The Iranians assembled
49
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the missiles and then transported them to Hizbollah via Syria.21 There are
also reports of arms shipments originating in North Korea that ended up
in the hands of Hizbollah. The "Reform Party in Syria" (RPS), an opposition group, reported in 2008 that Hizbollah had acquired chemical warfare (CW) agents from North Korea. According to RPS, mustard and nerve
gas were acquired from Pyongyang, with Syria acting as a conduit. The
CW agents can reportedly be weaponized and mounted on Hizbollah's
short-range missiles that target Israel.22

Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps
North Korea's ties to Hizbollah began in collaboration with yet another
organization identified by the U.S. State Department as an entity
supporting terrorism—the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).23
According to a 2008 Congressional Research Report, the North Koreans
collaborated with IRGC operatives (including active duty military
generals) in Hizbollah operations that included everything from the
shipment of short-range missiles and artillery, to the building of
underground facilities.24

Tamil Tigers
North Korea also has had connections to insurgents and terrorist groups
in South Asia. In 2000, a video of an attack by the Tamil Tigers (LTTE) on
a Sri Lankan navy ship showed speedboats that appeared to be of North
Korean origin. The video showed that the rebel group was also using a
North Korean variant of a Russian (and later Chinese) 107mm Katyusha
rocket launcher.25 A Jane's Intelligence Review article claimed that the
armaments being used by the LTTE were of North Korean origin:
"In the video, LTTE Sea Tigers can be seen using a variant of the
107mm Katyusha rocket, fired from a lightweight tripod, in pairs.
This is believed to be a variant of the Chinese Type 63 107mm
launcher. The Chinese produce a single tube version called a Type
85 fired from a man-portable tripod, but the North Koreans produce a double version. This is quite a rare weapon…."26
The North Koreans also attempted to provide the LTTE at least one shipment of 152mm and 130mm artillery shells and 120mm mortars during
2007. The Sri Lankan Navy interdicted the shipment. The Sri Lankan
Navy also seized an LTTE boat that was equipped with a 14.5mm machine
gun that was also assessed to be connected with North Koreans.27 North
Korean merchant ships carrying arms to the LTTE were intercepted by
the Sri Lankan Navy on three different occasions in October 2006, Febru50
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ary 2007, and March 2007. On several occasions the North Korean merchant ships fired on the Sri Lankan vessels, and the Sri Lankan Navy
reportedly sank two of the North Korean ships. The Congressional
Research Service issued a report in 2008 citing the Sankei Shimbun in
Japan, which states the Sri Lankan Government filed an official protest
with the North Koreans.28

Conclusion
North Korea has demonstrated throughout its history the intent and
capability to support terrorism. The reasons for this are twofold. First, the
North Korean leadership both fears and resents the Government of the
United States and its allies. Proliferation of training, weapons, and technology to non-state actors who engage in terrorist acts against America's
allies in the Middle East (particularly Israel) is perceived by Pyongyang to
be an effective way of ratcheting up contentious issues with Washington.
Second, economics has played an important role in Pyongyang's motivations for supporting terrorism, largely because North Korea's stability
originally depended on subsidies from the Soviet Union. Support for terrorism also provides the badly-needed hard currency for Pyongyang's
elite. Containing and combating North Korea's support for terrorism will
continue to be a foreign policy dilemma for the United States as long as
the current regime is in place.
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